Description
This book analyses how quantitative easing caused a sequence of markets to transform infected by asset price inflation. It explains how as an alternative of bringing about a quick return to prosperity from the Great Recession, the monetary experiment failed in its basic purpose. Bringing about economic debilitation, major financial speculation, waves of mal-investment in particular areas, and a colossal boom within the private equity industry, the experiment as an alternative produced monetary disorder.
Brendan Brown puts the monetary experiment into a global and historical context, examining in particular Japanese ‘folklore of deflation’ and the Federal Reserve’s first experiment of quantitative easing within the mid-1930s. The writer couples analysis from the Austrian school of monetary economics and Chicago monetarism with insights from behavioral finance, and concludes with major proposals for the present and the long run, including ideas for monetary reform in america, and suggestions for how investors can continue to exist the current market ‘plague’.