Description
Calvinist determinism destroys moral responsibility and makes God the writer of sin. These two accusations aren’t new, and were arguably anticipated by Paul in Romans 9, but they continue to be as of late an important objections offered against Calvinist/determinist views of human free will. This book is a philosophically rigorous and comprehensive defense of Calvinism against these two families of arguments. With respect to human moral responsibility, it discusses whether determinism destroys “free will,” turns humans into pets or puppets, and comes to or is comparable to coercion and manipulation. It responds to the consequence argument and direct argument for incompatibilism, the main of alternate possibilities, the “ought implies can” maxim, and related claims. With respect to the authorship of sin, it discusses whether Calvinist determinism improperly comes to God in evil. Does it mean that “God sins,” or “causes sin,” or “wills sin” in problematic ways? “Does God intend our sin, or (merely) permit sin?” In every case the coherence of the Calvinist view is defended against its such a lot potent objections, to reject the claim that Calvinism is “excusing sinners and blaming God.”